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Chairman: Mr. von WAGNER (Germany)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

1. The CHAIRMAN said that the "disarmament agenda" of previous sessions would remain crucial in relation to many pressing questions. The remarkable political developments of the recent past would help the Committee move towards consensus on hitherto untractable issues. The Committee should endeavour to merge resolutions which dealt with the same topic whenever political changes offered an opportunity to do so. The delegations involved needed to display sufficient flexibility and political will to compromise. The Committee might also wish to cluster the traditional topics of its work and the respective resolutions under so-called "head items". Delegations should also consider whether their resolutions still corresponded to the changed political climate after the end of the East-West confrontation.

2. The Committee might do well to narrow its focus with regard to the traditional disarmament agenda and, at the same time, widen it to comprise broader issues of peace and security. In view of the changes that had been taking place in the world, and the troubling new trends which threatened peace and security, the Committee should consider whether the arms control agenda comprehensively reflected its responsibilities and whether streamlining and rationalization were the only means to revitalize its work. Fewer resolutions on disarmament might signal a decline in the Committee's importance if such reduction was not accompanied by the opening up of other avenues for meaningful political activities. The Committee would not be giving the right signal to Governments, the public and public opinion makers if it simply reduced its workload at a time when military conflicts were flaring and means to prevent or contain them were desperately being sought.

3. The Committee's new name seemed to imply that the Committee was not intended to be a forum that focused exclusively on arms control questions. The Secretary-General had suggested that there was a need for the practical integration of disarmament and arms regulation issues into the broader structure of the international peace and security agenda. At the same time, however, the Committee had to keep in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations which circumscribed the scope for action by the General Assembly and its committees. However, notwithstanding Article 12 of the Charter, the Committee could, within the framework of its general responsibilities, make recommendations with regard to a dispute or situation which was not before the Security Council. The Committee could also formulate recommendations, guidelines or general principles relating to international peace and security with a view to promoting a deeper understanding of the concepts of preventive diplomacy, confidence-building and post-conflict peace-preserving measures. By putting the traditional disarmament agenda into the broader context of security concerns, emerging conflicts and risks to peace, the Committee might be in a better position to narrow it down to those items which were of paramount interest.

STATEMENT BY THE UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

4. Mr. GOULDING (Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs) recalled that in his report entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold war era" (A/C.1/47/7), the Secretary-General had argued that disarmament should be integrated into the broader structure of international peace and security rather than be pursued in isolation. There were considerable opportunities for progress in the field of disarmament. The 1995 Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provided an important opportunity for an internationally agreed response to the concerns about the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons. His Department had redeployed staff to provide the necessary input for the successful preparation of the Conference.

5. The decision by the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to begin substantive negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty at the beginning of 1994 showed that a new commitment was being made to realize that long-standing objective, especially on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. The successful completion of the negotiations on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction was an example of the work that could be done by the Conference on Disarmament with the participation of all sectors of the international community. That Convention would be the first multilateral instrument with comprehensive provisions for implementation which would apply equally to all parties. New commitments to negotiate a workable verification system for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction were also important, as had been recognized at the Third Review Conference.

6. There were signs of a new level of seriousness in tackling the difficult problems of the post-cold-war world. Solid work for cooperation and confidence-building had been undertaken in a number of regions; the strengthening of regional cooperation systems to include security issues provided a form of preventive diplomacy based on transparency. The Committee had an important role in encouraging those processes.

7. The proliferation of conventional weapons was one of the most ghastly legacies of the cold war. In his previous capacity as Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, he had been vividly aware of the extent to which conflict control and resolution in many parts of the world were complicated by the vast quantities of weapons which had been injected into those areas over the past two decades. Concerted action, primarily by Governments in their own territories, was needed to mop up the huge quantities of weapons which were in the hands of political groups or private individuals. The establishment of the new United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was an important step in creating greater openness and transparency in military matters. The indiscriminate use of landmines was another issue which required the urgent and decisive attention of the international community.

8. In order to respond to these opportunities and challenges, the Secretary-General had decided to rename the Office for Disarmament Affairs the "Centre for

(Mr. Goulding)

Disarmament Affairs" and to keep it in New York as an integral part of the Department of Political Affairs. With the agreement of the General Assembly, the staff would be brought back to its earlier strength with the proposed addition of three posts, primarily in connection with the work on the Register of Conventional Arms. The Secretary-General had instructed the Office to consider how confidence-building measures, verification and other techniques which had been developed and tested in the field of arms control and disarmament could be further developed and used as instruments of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building, with the consent of the Governments concerned. In that connection, the Centre had an advantage in that quite a few staff members had served in peace-keeping missions in recent months, bringing valuable experience from the field.

9. The Conference on Disarmament remained the principal forum for the negotiation of international agreements on arms control and disarmament. In view of the resignation of Mr. Bérasatégui, Secretary-General of the Conference, the Secretary-General had appointed Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, to be the Secretary-General of the Conference and to act as his Personal Representative to it, on an interim basis, with effect from 5 December 1993. Mr. Petrovsky would carry out those functions concurrently with his functions as Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva.

10. The work of the Centre's three regional centres was currently being re-examined in the light of the new opportunities for progress on a regional basis. The role of the centres might have to be redefined to ensure that their activities had an impact in the regions they served and formed an effective part of the Secretariat's response to the opportunities and challenges it faced.

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AGENDA ITEMS

11. Mr. MARIN-BOSCH (Mexico) said that for some time, the Conference on Disarmament had been feeling the impact of the rapid changes in the international situation; for the second consecutive year, its report to the General Assembly contained concrete results. The decision to undertake the long-postponed negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban would be a turning-point in the international community's efforts to stop and reverse nuclear proliferation in all its aspects. That decision had been possible, in large part, because of the change in position of the new United States Administration with regard to a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Unfortunately, it had not been possible to reach agreement on enlarging the composition of the Conference in 1993 because of a solitary negative voice. It was to be hoped that the country concerned would reconsider its position.

12. Washington and Moscow were beginning to reverse the nuclear-arms race, with the signing of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START), the Lisbon Protocol and the START II Treaty. Just as the nuclear-arms race had a dynamic of its own, promoted by the interests of the military and industrial complexes, the process of reducing those arsenals had its own dynamic which would demand ever larger reductions of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Marin-Bosch, Mexico)

However, in 10 years, when the provisions of the START treaties were fully implemented, the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States of America and Russia would still be larger than those of the late 1960s when the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been signed. Moreover, the world was flooded with tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and the international community had yet to agree on a clearly defined path with regard to those weapons of mass destruction.

13. Where nuclear testing was concerned, it had been possible to hope that the nuclear-weapon States would show restraint, thus benefiting the forthcoming negotiations on the subject. However, on 5 October 1993, China had broken the de facto test moratorium, and in the capitals of other nuclear-weapon States the debate had been reopened regarding the continuation of nuclear testing. That would have negative repercussions on the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. The resumption of testing had already had immediate political consequences, and could affect directly the dialogue on nuclear non-proliferation. The nuclear-weapon States would have little authority to demand from others what they themselves were unwilling to do, and to conduct a few tests, small or very large, before closing the door definitively to others did not seem a very serious pattern of behaviour. The question arose of whether the nuclear-weapon States enjoyed special privileges. As NPT Parties, the five had undertaken to continue negotiations "to seek to achieve the discontinuation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time", as the text of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT) put it. Moreover, article VI of the NPT stated that each of the Parties to the Treaty undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and a comprehensive test ban was the key to that "cessation of the nuclear arms race".

14. Thirty years ago Mexico, like other members of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), had pointed out that the PTBT represented a "first step" towards the complete prohibition of nuclear tests and towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control, while on signing the PTBT, the United States Secretary of State had stated that history would eventually record how the world dealt with the unfinished business of peace. Over three long decades the "business of peace" had remained unfinished. It was true that in the 1970s there had been attempts to negotiate a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), but that opportunity, and others, had been squandered. Hence the initiative taken by several countries, including his own, to seek a comprehensive test ban by amending the PTBT. That process continued, and in August 1993 important advances had been achieved during the consultations held in New York by the President of the Amendment Conference. It had been agreed that the PTBT amendment process complemented other efforts and offered obvious advantages in certain areas over other approaches. In the meantime the Conference on Disarmament had decided to negotiate a CTBT beginning in January of 1994.

15. But the road between the Conference's decision and the CTBT negotiation itself was proving somewhat difficult. During the past week, differences had begun to emerge in Geneva as to how best to utilize the time between October and

(Mr. Marin-Bosch, Mexico)

January. Obviously some nuclear Powers wanted a rather slow pace, whereas the majority of the Conference members preferred a faster one. The members of the Group of 21 had even suggested that the Conference set 1994 as the target date for the conclusion of a CTBT.

16. Given the Conference's decision to undertake negotiations in January, it was obviously important to translate that political agreement at once into one on paper. To that end, an effort must be made to find compromise formulas ensuring an expeditious negotiation, and members of the Conference should therefore begin at once the discussion of the two main aspects of the future CTBT: the scope of the prohibition and its verification system. However, rapid enough progress would certainly not be made if there was insistence on delaying the negotiations or conducting more nuclear tests.

17. The NPT prohibited its non-nuclear-weapon Parties from acquiring nuclear weapons and therefore from carrying out nuclear tests. But several dozen countries had not yet adhered to the NPT. Would they and the rest of the international community accept the establishment of a kind of testing quota for each of the nuclear-weapon States before the CTBT's entry into force?

18. The five nuclear-weapon States had said that they were ready to conclude a CTBT. But their motives were not necessarily identical, because of the different levels of nuclear development involved. Nevertheless, all appreciated, to varying degrees, the advantages that a CTBT would have in strengthening the horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Some even saw it as a step to ensure vertical non-proliferation, and thus as paving the way towards nuclear disarmament.

19. That point opened up an area of fundamental importance. To speak of the five nuclear-weapon States was to make a formal distinction, based on the NPT and on a merely chronological consideration. But other considerations led to a different approach. For example, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine had nuclear weapons but had never tested; South Africa had had six devices without testing them and now said that it no longer had them; India had had at least one; it was generally assumed that Israel had nuclear weapons, while it was believed that there were other countries that also had them. Nevertheless, the international community remained attached to the NPT and its somewhat archaic definitions. The fact was that, in the 1990s, of the lines between nuclear-weapon States and some non-nuclear-weapon States were becoming blurred, with some of the latter importing large quantities of plutonium for their advanced civilian nuclear industry. Those and other highly industrialized countries were "potential nuclear-weapon States", since they could produce a nuclear device in a matter of months or weeks. Then there were the so-called nuclear "threshold States", countries that had significant nuclear programmes but were not parties to the NPT. And now there was a third category of non-NPT countries, the "temporary nuclear-weapon States" including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and South Africa.

20. The foregoing were some of the questions which the NPT Parties should examine during the preparatory process of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Another question was what had happened in Iraq, a party to the NPT, and why. United Nations and IAEA inspectors had found an impressive amount of

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material in Iraq betraying an ambitious nuclear programme: it seemed impossible that for years, especially in the 1980s, so-called "sensitive" material had been exported in such quantities without any of the exporting States (all of them NPT Parties) suspecting that the Iraqis were building something? The question also arose of the impact on the future of the NPT non-proliferation regime of the recent case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

21. The Chemical Weapons Convention attempted to remedy those rather confusing situations regarding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Convention required each Party to declare, once it entered into force, whether it possessed chemical weapons, whether there were such weapons on its territory, whether it had transferred or received them since 1 January 1946, and whether there were or had been chemical weapon facilities on its territory. Therein lay the key to the CWC's uniform regime for all parties. In relation to chemical, and also biological, weapons, there was nothing resembling the "caste society" that existed in the nuclear field, and there, too, have to disappear if a genuine, universal and equitable nuclear non-proliferation regime was to be built. Nuclear-weapon States (and some others) could not continue to demand a right to observe others' nuclear installations, whether unilaterally or through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). That was certainly not conducive to the climate of confidence or openness so often required of other countries with regard to other weapons and weapons systems.

22. The international community in general and the five nuclear-weapon States in particular now had an opportunity to move forward decisively in the field of nuclear disarmament. The preparatory process of the 1995 NPT review and extension conference offered the best vehicle to undertake a frank dialogue on the future nuclear non-proliferation regime.

23. The question of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in all its aspects and of ballistic missiles was gaining increasing importance. His delegation believed that the time had come to request the Geneva Conference to undertake a more intense and formal examination of that subject, and that it merited consideration in the different multilateral disarmament forums, including the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The Secretary-General should prepare, with the help of a small group of governmental experts, a brief study on the question, which was of vital importance to the international community. His delegation intended to explore with other interested delegations the possibility of submitting a draft resolution in that regard.

24. Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt), speaking as President of the Conference on Disarmament, introduced the annual report of the Conference on its work during the 1993 session (A/48/27). The current report did not, as had been the case in 1992, transmit an international instrument for consideration by the General Assembly, but the Conference had, however, worked very hard on a number of substantive and organizational matters, thus advancing its consideration of issues of vital importance for international peace and security. In particular, on 10 August 1993 the Conference had decided, inter alia, to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a CTB, with consultations being held between 3 September 1993 and 17 January 1994 on the specific mandate for, and organization of, the negotiations. Thus, for the first time since the

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Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water of 5 August 1963, the multilateral negotiating forum of the international community was proceeding to the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. That long-sought objective of the international community seemed now to be closer than ever before. The forthcoming negotiation on an item to which the General Assembly had assigned the highest priority since the conclusion of the PTBT implied a political commitment which would require the necessary Secretariat resources to ensure that the negotiations received support.

25. With regard to the composition of the Conference, the Special Coordinator for membership had conducted detailed consultations before submitting his report, which appeared in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the annual report. As noted in paragraph 15, many members and non-members had made statements on the subject, but no conclusion had been reached before the end of the annual session. The President had accordingly been mandated to continue consultations to achieve consensus during the intersessional period. He had started those consultations, and intended to continue them until the beginning of the 1994 session. While difficulties remained, members were fully conscious of the need to expand the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. That common ground would be helpful in achieving the expansion of the Conference.

26. With respect to the Conference's methods of work, informal open-ended consultations had been held, and the discussions and their results were reflected in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the annual report. The shorter report the Conference was submitting to the Assembly's current session was the result of the review undertaken on its improved and effective functioning.

27. The activities of the four ad hoc committees set up by the Conference during the 1993 annual session deserved to be highlighted. The Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban had made progress in its consideration of various issues of importance to the agenda item, and had also reviewed aspects relating to structure and scope, as well as verification and compliance. There had been general recognition that in order to ensure compliance with a future CTBT, an effective internationally applicable verification system would be required. Preliminary work had also been started, for the first time in the history of the Conference, on non-seismic means of verification. It was widely recognized in the Conference that the adoption of a decision to give the Ad Hoc Committee a negotiating mandate was a major turning-point for multilateral work towards a CTBT.

28. The Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space had considered various areas relating to its future work, and had also expressed its appreciation of the organization by the Friends of the Chairman of open-ended consultations on the issues of CBMs, terminology and legal aspects related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. There had been wide agreement that the conclusion of an international agreement or agreements to prevent such an arms race remained the Committee's fundamental task and that the proposals on CBMs could form an integral part of those agreements. It had been recommended that at the beginning of the 1994 session, the Conference on Disarmament re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space with an appropriate mandate to continue substantive work on all the issues before it.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

29. The Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, continuing its review of that important subject, had expressed the view that there was a need to step up efforts in the light of recent transformations in the international political climate. Accordingly, it had agreed to recommend that the Ad Hoc Committee should be re-established at the beginning of the 1994 session.

30. In 1993, the Conference had for the first time established the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. At its first session, the Committee had covered a great amount of new ground, including a substantive exchange of views on a number of complex issues surrounding that subject. It had discussed excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms, military holdings and procurement through national production, and arms transfers and transfers of high technology with military applications, as well as weapons of mass destruction. Eighteen working papers had been submitted to it, several of them containing concrete proposals. Although agreement had not been reached on them, delegations had concurred that many of the issues they dealt with worked to promote trust, confidence-building and stability. The Ad Hoc committee had therefore recommended that it be re-established at the beginning of the 1994 session of the Conference.

31. The work of the Conference in 1993 had continued a positive trend which had started the year before with the landmark agreement on the convention prohibiting all chemical weapons. New ideas and common ground were emerging as international cooperation replaced the confrontations of the Cold War. The decision to begin negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty was one of the outstanding developments in the post-Cold War period. While the negotiations would certainly not be easy and a number of sensitive questions would have to be addressed, he was confident that the Conference would be able to discharge its heavy responsibilities as the international disarmament negotiating body of the international community.

32. Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia) said that three significant events had taken place since the Committee had last met. First, the Convention on Chemical Weapons had been completed, opened for signature and had attracted widespread international support. The Provisional Technical Secretariat set up in that connection was a fine example of multilateral cooperation; its activities were already well under way, which augured well for the effective implementation of the Treaty. He urged all signatory States to take the necessary steps so as to ensure the earliest possible implementation of the Convention. Likewise, he appealed to non-signatory States to reconsider their position with a view to ensuring the universal application of the global ban on chemical weapons.

33. Second, the important decision by the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a CTBT heralded a new and long-awaited era in international disarmament negotiations. The Treaty would serve the dual purpose of inhibiting the production of new generations of nuclear weapons as well as enhancing the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Australia was confident that the bulk of the work on the Treaty could be completed in time for the NPT review conference in April 1995. However, it was important that work on the political, legal and

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verification aspects of the Treaty should proceed in parallel and should be mutually reinforcing. Australia was willing to consider the possibility of allowing additional time for negotiations at the 1994 session of the Conference on Disarmament. In view of the progress made towards the start of negotiations on a treaty, the recent decision of China to violate the de facto moratorium on nuclear testing which had been observed for more than a year was indeed regrettable.

34. Australia hoped for greater unilateral assurances of security in the form of a joint declaration or other binding statement by States which had retained nuclear weapons that they would not use them against countries which had undertaken a commitment to non-proliferation. Together with the CTBT, such action would greatly facilitate the review and extension of NPT.

35. The extension of the NPT at the 1995 Review Conference was essential not least to provide a secure legal basis for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Australia, like many other countries, was in favour of the indefinite extension of the Treaty and would continue to participate actively in the preparatory meetings for the 1995 Conference.

36. The end of the cold war era had provided both challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and opportunities to strengthen it. Anxious about the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia, his country would welcome a more active dialogue on nuclear matters between India and Pakistan. Likewise, Ukraine and Kazakhstan should be encouraged to fulfil their obligations under the Lisbon Protocol to START I and accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States, following the example of Belarus.

37. Australia also welcomed South Africa's cooperation with IAEA since its accession to NPT, and in particular its policy of full transparency regarding its nuclear activities. However, the continued failure of Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with the IAEA safeguard obligations remained a matter of deep concern.

38. Australia fully supported efforts undertaken since the Gulf War to strengthen the effectiveness and transparency of the IAEA safeguards system, as well as the work of the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI), and encouraged other countries to do likewise. With regard to the latter, he stressed the importance of the effective implementation of safeguards agreements for the prevention of clandestine nuclear activities and the promotion of confidence in the NPT-based non-proliferation regime.

39. The tightening of nuclear-use export controls and strengthening of nuclear supplier arrangements would also underscore the non-proliferation objectives of the NPT. Furthermore, regional non-proliferation arrangements such as the treaties of Tlatelolco in Latin America and Rarotonga in the South Pacific complemented the international non-proliferation regime based on the NPT. Steps towards the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the other regions would not only forge a more positive attitude towards non-proliferation arrangements in those regions but also encourage regional support for the NPT in the lead-up to the 1995 conference.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

40. Australia looked forward to participating in the coming years in negotiations for an end to the production of fissionable material and for multilateral non-discriminatory controls on the purchase of destabilizing missile systems, particularly those used for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction.

41. The risk posed by the proliferation of biological weapons had tended to be underestimated as a potential threat to international security. Australia had long been concerned that the effectiveness of the only global instrument for the abolition of such weapons - the Biological Weapons Convention - was limited by the absence of mechanisms to verify compliance with the obligations under the Convention. It therefore welcomed the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts which concluded that verification measures would enhance the effective implementation of the Convention, and also provided a sound technical basis for developing the verification mechanism required. In that connection Australia supported the convening of a special conference for that purpose, and suggested that other States parties should do likewise by notifying one of the depositary countries without delay.

42. Since the end of the cold war, the Committee had been able to address more effectively the issue of regional security, as well as to encourage arms control and security and confidence-building measures in particular regions. Progress had been made in his region with the ASEAN countries taking a leading role in establishing a dialogue on security in the wider Asia Pacific region by setting up the ASEAN Regional Forum. Australia had also participated in the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group co-sponsored by the United States of America and Russia, and looked forward to further developments in that area.

43. As to military transparency particularly in regard to armaments, he noted with satisfaction that many countries had already sent their replies to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. He looked forward to participating actively during the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament in the future development of global transparency mechanisms and arms acquisition guidelines. Another important matter which must be addressed in the near future was the need for more effective rules governing the use of land mines which called for a review of the Convention on Inhumane Weapons.

44. In conclusion, he recalled that he had been entrusted with the task of looking into how to expand the Conference on Disarmament so that it could perform its duties more effectively. Following extensive informal consultations, he had proposed to the Conference a compromise solution on which it had regrettably been unable to reach agreement. None the less, he was confident that, with the assistance of the President of the Conference, a solution could be found which would meet with general approval.

45. Mr. PIZARRO (Chile) said that despite the end of the cold war, important work still had to be done in the field of disarmament. His Government deplored the recent violation by China of the voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, which had prompted the other nuclear Powers to reconsider their commitments in that respect.

(Mr. Pizarro, Chile)

46. One matter of particular concern was the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. While Chile endorsed the purpose of the Treaty, it continued to view it as a discriminatory instrument, believing that the inequality of rights and obligations between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States had largely been responsible for the greater proliferation of such weapons. None the less the Chilean Government had reconsidered its position on the NPT in the hope that the parties would also be more flexible and allow the participation of observers in the preparatory meetings for the 1995 Conference. It was important to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the current political climate for the unrestricted discussion of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

47. A further cause for concern was the lack of agreement on the question of expanding the Conference on Disarmament. He urged the parties concerned to intensify their consultations with a view to resolving the remaining difficulties regarding the proposal by the representative of Australia, which his country regarded as a viable alternative.

48. As it approached its fiftieth anniversary, the United Nations must take up the challenge of becoming a true catalyst of international peace and security. In that connection, he endorsed the proposals for rationalizing the work and revising the agenda of the Committee. The aim should be for the Committee to issue more binding norms which would effectively strengthen international peace and security.

49. The Latin American and Caribbean region was firmly committed to the cause of disarmament, as borne out by the political will of Argentina, Brazil and Chile to ensure implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, not to mention the agreements on nuclear matters between Argentina and Brazil, whose provisions went beyond those of comparable agreements.

50. With regard to the Convention on Chemical Weapons, the final declaration of a regional seminar held recently in Santiago drew attention, inter alia, to the importance of ensuring the universal applicability of the Convention as well as the effective and balanced operations of its verification regime. Furthermore, the Mendoza Accord on the total ban of chemical and biological weapons had already attracted broad support at the regional level. The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) was currently before the Chilean Chamber of Deputies for ratification.

51. The large number of replies received by the Centre for Disarmament Affairs in connection with the Register of Conventional Arms was encouraging. It was important to improve the Register with a view to making it a real means of promoting confidence at bilateral, regional and global levels. To that end his Government had not only reported on transfers but also on its stocks and indicated its willingness to participate in forthcoming meetings of governmental experts on the subject.

(Mr. Pizarro, Chile)

52. Disarmament problems remained urgent, and their relationship to international security was more evident than in the past. His Government was concerned that the human and material resources allocated to the Office of Disarmament Affairs no longer met its requirements.

53. One of the main problems which had come to the fore since the emergence of a new international order was that of human security, which went beyond traditional notions of security and was determined in many parts of the world by poverty. In that connection he suggested that the Committee should bear four considerations in mind during its discussions. First, the security of individuals was now as important as, if not more important than, security of the State. Second, security problems in one country, region or geographical area could become a source of instability that extended beyond the frontiers of the area in question. Third, a modern concept of security must take account of economic, social, environmental and other problems. Lastly, the ending of the cold war had provided an opportunity to resurrect concepts formerly thwarted by ideological confrontation such as "zones of peace". There had been ample proof in Latin America that such zones were a useful means of promoting cooperation and understanding as well as easing potential military tensions.

54. Disarmament must be a world-wide process which, taking due account of the characteristics of each region, should bring about real improvements in the living conditions of people in the developing countries. He believed the United Nations was the appropriate forum to achieve those aims as laid down in its Charter. It was therefore essential not to miss the unique opportunity afforded by the current political climate to achieve substantial progress in international disarmament, peace and security which would benefit generations to come.

55. Mr. MROZIEWICZ (Poland) said that since 1989, the international arena had undergone radical changes which had affected the very essence of international security. While since the end of the cold war some sources of instability and regional conflicts had ceased to exist and new opportunities emerged to settle old disputes, other dormant conflicts had come to life, fuelled by an increase in nationalist and even xenophobic sentiments. For decades international security had hinged on the balance of military forces, but now the role of the Security Council and the involvement of regional organizations had considerably increased as the political means of guaranteeing security had come to the fore.

56. Poland enjoyed good relations with its neighbouring countries through cooperation with inter alia the VISEGRAD Group and the Baltic States. It also encouraged the strengthening of ties with the countries of Western Europe, the United States of America and Canada; joining the north Atlantic Alliance and the European Community were among the priorities of Polish foreign policy.

57. The fundamental challenge facing Europe at present was the establishment of a system which would provide equal security for all European countries. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) had an important role to play in that regard and could constitute a forum for the settlement of disputes and prevention of conflicts. If necessary, the CSCE might request the intervention of the relevant military alliances. They would have the dual role

(Mr. Mroziewicz, Poland)

of alliances in the sense of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and of institutions exercising Pan-European responsibilities, a role to which Poland attached particular importance.

58. The NTP was a major pillar of international security, and should therefore be indefinitely extended at the 1995 review conference. The success of that Conference would be promoted by constructive negotiations on the CTBT at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Motivated by its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and with the support of the Eastern European Group, which had not yet held the presidency of an NPT review conference, Poland intended to nominate a candidate for that presidency.

59. The proliferation of materials and technologies for the production of weapons of mass destruction and the clandestine sales of such materials and technologies to regions of potential conflict posed an increasing challenge to international peace and security, and should therefore remain high on the agenda.

60. Welcoming the signing by some 150 States of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, he stressed the urgent need to ensure the timely entry into force of that Convention and cooperation by signatory States with the Preparatory Commission for the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The Netherlands, together with Canada and Poland, would submit a draft resolution on that issue.

61. Poland welcomed the establishment, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, of an Ad Hoc Committee on the establishment of Transparency in Armaments. The regional workshop organized earlier in 1993 in Poland by the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs had facilitated participation by States from the region in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, to which Poland attached great importance.

62. New realities and disarmament priorities necessitated an overhaul of the disarmament machinery, including such measures as rationalizing the agenda of the First Committee and streamlining its modus operandi, thus reducing the number, and enhancing the credibility, of its resolutions. He welcomed the decision by the Conference on Disarmament to focus on four items only in 1993, with the prompt establishment of the respective ad hoc subsidiary bodies, but regretted the failure to reach consensus on the vital issue of the expansion of the Conference's membership. It was essential to find a compromise solution which accommodated the different aspirations of States seeking membership of the Conference without undermining its negotiating strength.

63. Mr. CISSE (Senegal) said that the optimism generated by positive changes in the international context and the increasing involvement of the Organization in international peace efforts was tempered by concerns at the resurgence of armed conflicts. Only complete and universal disarmament would make possible the multilateral cooperation, and consequent economic and social development, necessary to ensure that those conflicts could be overcome.

(Mr. Cisse, Senegal)

64. Senegal was therefore encouraged by the significant progress made in the area of disarmament during 1993, including the signing of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, and hoped that the necessary steps would soon be completed to ensure its entry into force, which would lead to the historically unprecedented elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction.

65. Senegal also welcomed the signing in 1993 by the United States of America and the Russian Federation of START II, and hoped that the remaining obstacles to the ratification of the Lisbon Protocol would be overcome without delay.

66. He noted with concern that many issues, particularly those concerning procedure, relating to the 1995 Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty remained unresolved, and drew attention, in particular, to the question of the presidency of the Conference, signalling his delegation's support for the candidature of Ambassador Dhamapala, put forward by the Non-Aligned Movement.

67. As a non-nuclear State, Senegal particularly welcomed the recent decision to entrust the Disarmament Commission with the negotiation of a complete test-ban treaty, and pledged its readiness to contribute actively to that important project.

68. At the regional level, Senegal had welcomed South Africa's announcement that it would dismantle its nuclear weapons. He stressed the need for IAEA to be fully notified of the inventory of nuclear material resulting from that process of dismantling and, in general, for all such nuclear material to be placed under total control or transferred out of Africa, with a view to ensuring the denuclearization of the African continent.

69. In the Asian region, Senegal welcomed the joint declaration by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America on efforts to achieve a denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and the decision by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT and to pursue negotiations with IAEA.

70. Despite progress in the reduction and control of certain categories of weapons of mass destruction, the precarious political, economic and social equilibrium in the world was increasingly threatened by the growing build-up of conventional arms in certain vulnerable regions. His delegation therefore welcomed the establishment of the Register of Conventional Arms, and hoped that current discussions would lead to greater transparency in that area.

71. Efforts by the Organization to promote disarmament and arms regulation could only succeed with the support of all Member States, particularly the major Powers with their formidable military arsenals. Efforts to build a world of peace and security also necessitated combating hunger, poverty and sickness, which were capable, if left unattended, of becoming more serious threats to international peace and security than those posed by military arsenals.

72. Mr. PERRI (Brazil) said that, despite positive events in the post-cold-war world, such as the recent agreement between Israel and Palestine and the dismantling of apartheid, new conflicts had emerged and old ones re-emerged, rendering the maintenance of international peace and security much more complex than had been anticipated at the end of an age dominated by ideological confrontations. Particular significance attached, therefore, to preventive diplomacy, since peace-building through the promotion of a fair and equitable international order was the best diplomacy in a world in which political, military and economic imbalances still persisted.

73. As the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs had stressed in his statement to the General Assembly, the international agenda was, as before, structured around democracy, development and disarmament with their ramifications in the areas of human rights, environment and international security, and those three elements constituted the necessary foundations for peace in the new international order which the Organization was striving to build.

74. Among encouraging recent initiatives, he welcomed the signing of START II and the plans by the United States to prohibit the production of fissionable materials. The more peaceful international situation had created an opportunity to reduce military budgets and convert military industries into civilian uses. Brazil hoped that the resources freed in that process would stimulate economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing world, and, in that context, welcomed the proposal that the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) should coordinate the establishment of the United Nations interdepartmental task force on conversion.

75. At the multilateral level, Brazil noted with satisfaction the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention by 150 countries and urged the remaining countries to add their signatures. In addition, Brazil welcomed progress in the areas of verification of biological weapons, control of conventional weapons and the prohibition of nuclear tests. It urged nuclear States not to resume testing and to persevere in their efforts to achieve a multilaterally agreed and internationally verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty, particularly since the cessation of nuclear tests was crucial in halting vertical proliferation and progress in horizontal non-proliferation could be jeopardized if vertical proliferation was not stopped.

76. He hoped that negotiations on expanding the membership of the Conference on Disarmament would be successfully concluded, thus meeting the need of further democratizing the Conference without impairing its efficiency.

77. He stressed the need to complete work at the next session of the Conference on Disarmament on its remaining agenda items, and drew attention to Brazil's special interest in promoting discussion on the item related to science and technology, in the belief that consensus among supplier and recipient countries on the proposed guidelines and recommendations would be of crucial importance in strengthening international security and promoting economic and social development. A more peaceful and prosperous international order would result from universal commitment to the use and transfer of high technology for exclusively peaceful purposes.

(Mr. Perri, Brazil)

78. He commended the significant achievements in the field of disarmament of such United Nations bodies as the Office (now Centre) for Disarmament Affairs, the regional Centres for Disarmament, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. Nevertheless, the continued existence of nuclear arsenals still posed a threat to peace and security. In that connection, he expressed concern at the precarious situation in parts of the former USSR where strategic nuclear weapons were stationed.

79. Following the adoption of various international instruments by Brazil and other countries in the region, Latin America was on the verge of becoming a region in which nuclear weapons would be definitively banned. He hoped that the Treaty of Tlatelolco, recently approved by the Brazilian Government, would be adopted by other countries in the region and would be fully in force by the end of 1993.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.